SAP patched four maximum-severity flaws. Start with whatever faces the internet.

SAP's 10 November Patch Day closed four CVSS 10.0 holes in NetWeaver, Web Dispatcher and Gateway. No attacks are reported yet. Here is the order we would patch in.

FluxOrbit4 min read

SAP's Security Patch Day on 10 November fixed four vulnerabilities with the maximum CVSS score of 10.0. They sit in the Internet Communication Manager of NetWeaver AS ABAP, in SAP Web Dispatcher, in SAP Gateway and in the SAML2 Service Provider that handles SAML-based logon on the ABAP platform, and SAP's own CVE records say each can be used by an attacker with no account on the system.

None of the four is known to be under attack yet.

What SAP released

By SAP's count, the day brought 35 new security notes, four GitHub security advisories and three updates to earlier notes. Its bulletin rates nine of the entries Critical and 17 High.

Other write-ups count differently: Pathlock's 38 leaves out the GitHub advisories, SecurityWeek's 42 is SAP's three figures added together, and Onapsis's 43 includes notes SAP published or updated between the October and November patch days.

SAP's release shared the day with Microsoft's Patch Tuesday, the subject of our earlier post.

The four at the top

SAP noteCVEComponentFlaw, as SAP titles it
3778530CVE-2026-76964NetWeaver AS ABAP, Internet Communication Manager (ICM)Memory corruption
3778556CVE-2026-89126SAP Web DispatcherMemory corruption
3798345CVE-2026-89103SAP GatewayBroken access control
3849308CVE-2026-120017NetWeaver AS ABAP and ABAP Platform, SAML2 Service ProviderMissing authentication

In SAP's descriptions, the ICM and Web Dispatcher flaws come from insufficient validation of network input, which can corrupt memory and could let an attacker run code. In Gateway, a default access control list grants too much, so an external caller can be classed as an internal application server. The SAML2 flaw applies "under certain configurations", in which incoming authentication assertions are not verified properly and an attacker could impersonate any user, privileged accounts included.

Onapsis, which reported three of the four according to BleepingComputer, calls the first pair ICM2SHELL and the Gateway flaw PROXYGATE.

SAP's bulletin lists kernel releases 7.53 to 9.20 for the ICM flaw, 7.22 to 9.21 for Gateway, and SAP_BASIS 702 to 922 for SAML2. The Web Dispatcher entry also covers the dispatcher built into SAP HANA. Onapsis adds that kernels out of maintenance are affected too and must be upgraded.

Internet-facing components matter because a stranger can reach them without first getting inside the network: BleepingComputer describes Web Dispatcher as the load balancer and reverse proxy for web requests entering an SAP system, and Onapsis notes that taking one over puts an attacker in front of every system behind it.

Exploitation status

SAP's bulletin says nothing about attacks. Onapsis, in advisories last updated on 12 November, says it has not observed exploitation. CISA's assessment on each of the four CVE records lists no exploitation, and its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, read on 15 November, showed no SAP flaw added since Patch Day.

That does not make them safe. Onapsis says it gave SAP a working exploit for the ICM and Web Dispatcher flaw, SecurityWeek reports, and BleepingComputer counts 14 SAP flaws that CISA has flagged as exploited since November 2021.

The fix, and where there is no workaround

The notes sit on SAP's support portal and were not read for this post. What follows is how Onapsis and Pathlock, two SAP security firms, summarise them.

The ICM and Web Dispatcher flaws are closed by kernel, Web Dispatcher and HANA patches (notes 3778530 and 3778556, FAQ note 3778788). Two temporary measures exist. A patched Web Dispatcher shields only the back-end systems reached exclusively through it. WebSocket support can be switched off, though SAP warns of a significant effect on interactive and integration scenarios. Leaving WebSocket unused is not protection, Onapsis says, because support is on by default.

The Gateway fix is not finished when the kernel patch is in: a profile parameter, gw/acl_mode_proxy, has to be set by hand afterwards (FAQ note 3810197). The SAML2 fix comes as correction instructions or support packages, Pathlock says, with FAQ note 3849602.

Those two have no stopgap. Pathlock says of both notes that no workaround is available, and Onapsis says SAP lists none for Gateway. What remains is limiting who can reach the service. Onapsis holds that a Gateway has no reason to be reachable from the internet. For SAML2, Pathlock advises reviewing SAML verification settings and reducing access to sign-in endpoints until the correction is applied.

The order we would patch in

  1. Internet-facing Web Dispatchers and ICMs. Onapsis says to patch these first, and we agree.
  2. Gateway. Confirm that no Gateway port answers from the internet or a partner network, then patch and set the parameter on every application server.
  3. SAML2. Apply note 3849308 on every ABAP system that uses SAML-based logon.
  4. The other five Critical notes. They score 9.1 to 9.9 and, by Pathlock's reading, need a logged-in attacker or an administrator's interaction.
  5. High-priority notes and the GitHub advisories. The advisories cover code libraries such as the SAP Cloud SDK for Python, so they go to development teams.

Non-production systems count too. If SAP or a hosting partner runs your systems, we would ask for patch dates in writing; Onapsis cites a separate FAQ note, 3849055, for private cloud customers.

Our advice for the first hour: list every SAP entry point that answers from the internet, with its kernel release and patch level. All four flaws score 10.0, so the score cannot set the order. Reach can.

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