On 9 November the US cybersecurity agency CISA added four vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation. They affect GPUStack, SignalWire FreeSWITCH, OpenSSH and IBM Aspera Faspex, and US federal agencies were given until 12 November, three days, to deal with them.
The KEV list is CISA's record of flaws known to be used in real attacks, and its due dates bind only US federal civilian agencies, under a directive called BOD 26-04. For everyone else they are a signal, though CISA's alert encourages every organisation to prioritise what is listed.
This signal is strong. The exploited Outlook flaw from this month's Patch Tuesday joined the list a day later with two weeks to fix. These four got three days, and each entry is flagged for "forensic triage". The alert says what that involves: checking whether attackers were already inside before the patch went on.
The four at a glance
| Affected | CVE | What it allows | CVSS | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GPUStack before 2.2.0 | CVE-2026-102895 | Administrator access without logging in | 9.8 (maintainers) | 2.2.0 |
| FreeSWITCH 1.11.2 and earlier | CVE-2026-116779 | Server commands from one SIP message | 9.8 (maintainers) | 1.11.3 |
| OpenSSH before 10.6p2, on some Linux systems | CVE-2026-123158 | Logging in without the password | 8.1 (CVE record) | 10.6p2 |
| IBM Aspera Faspex 5.0.0 to 5.0.19 | CVE-2026-123218 | Full admin rights for a logged-in user | 9.8 (IBM) | 5.0.19 PL1 |
GPUStack and FreeSWITCH: default settings, old fixes
GPUStack is open-source software for serving AI models on GPU clusters. Its advisory says versions before 2.2.0, by default, treated any request that appeared to come from the server itself as the built-in administrator. Behind a reverse proxy on the same machine, a layout the advisory calls canonical, every visitor looks local. That gives admin access with no credentials, then code execution on worker hosts. One attack on a 2.1.1 deployment, the advisory reports, left custom backends running reverse shells.
FreeSWITCH is open-source telecoms software. SignalWire's advisory says one inbound SIP chat message can make version 1.11.2 or earlier run commands with the privileges of the FreeSWITCH process. Chat handling is on by default, tightening the inbound access list does not help, and where message authentication is enforced any single account is enough. The advisory says exploitation has been observed in the wild.
Neither fix is new. GitHub's release pages date GPUStack 2.2.0 to 18 June and FreeSWITCH 1.11.3 to 28 August. If you cannot upgrade at once, the advisories offer stopgaps: set force_auth_localhost=true in GPUStack, and enable-chat=false on every FreeSWITCH profile that does not need inbound SIP chat.
OpenSSH: narrow, and under attack
The OpenSSH release notes limit this one to Linux systems that use the musl C library with PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) support disabled. OpenSSH 10.6p2, released on 5 November, works around it.
Alpine Linux, which is built on musl, is the main case. Its advisory says every release it checked is affected when password authentication is on (the default), one account has no password set, which is normal for key-only accounts, and another has a password hash. Containers that do not run sshd are not affected. Fixes are in Alpine 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4. Restart sshd afterwards, because upgrading does not replace the running daemon. Setting PasswordAuthentication no also closes the hole. Ubuntu marks its OpenSSH package as not affected, because it is linked against glibc and uses PAM.
GreyNoise, which tracks attack traffic through its own sensors, says working exploits are public. One of its vulnerable sensors was first exploited on 7 November, under two days after the fix, and by 15 November it had confirmed post-exploitation activity from ten attacker IP addresses.
IBM Aspera Faspex: the version number can mislead
IBM's bulletin, dated 7 November in its change history, says Faspex 5.0.0 to 5.0.19 lets a user bypass authorisation with a crafted message and gain full administrative privileges. The fix is 5.0.19 PL1 for Linux, a patch level of an affected release, so the version number alone proves nothing. IBM lists no workaround and says to validate that the faspex-core container image reads 5.0.19 (1ce4b13, Fix Pack: 1).
IBM's text and CISA's entry describe an authenticated attacker, yet IBM's 9.8 score rests on a vector that says no privileges are required, so we would not count on the login requirement. IBM's bulletin also says nothing about attacks, and Security Affairs wrote on 10 November that it had found no public confirmation of exploitation. That report cites the older directive BOD 22-01 and dates the OpenSSH listing to 6 November. CISA's own pages say BOD 26-04 and 9 November, which we follow.
What we would do first
- Find out what you run. CISA notes that GPUStack, FreeSWITCH and OpenSSH may sit inside other products, so we would ask suppliers of phone systems and AI tooling, and check every Alpine server and cloud image.
- Patch whatever faces the internet. Where that has to wait, apply the stopgaps above or take the service off the public network.
- Then look for intruders. Our advice is to treat an exposed, unpatched instance as suspect. On GPUStack, review users, API keys and inference backends nobody on your team created. On Alpine, the advisory says to search
/var/log/messagesforAccepted password forlines naming accounts with no password. Where a login cannot be ruled out, Alpine says to treat the machine as compromised. We would apply that to all four.